Page:Taylor-Travis v. Jackson State University (17-60856) (2021) Opinion.pdf/16

 language seized on by the parties appears in a one-sentence summary of the court’s legal conclusion included at the end of the opinion, which states “34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) implies a private right of action for retaliation, narrowly tailored to the claims of employees who suffer unlawful retaliation solely as a consequence of complaints alleging noncompliance with the substantive provisions of title IX.”

Reading the phrase “solely as a consequence of complaints alleging noncompliance with the substantive provisions of title IX” as establishing a sole causation standard stretches Lowrey too far. Lowrey examined whether a Title IX retaliation claim could be based on a complaint about conduct prohibited by Title VII and held that it could not. Lowrey did not focus on the causation standard in Title IX retaliation claims. To the extent that it addressed that issue, Lowrey stated that “the anti-retaliation provision of title IX is similar to those of title VII and the ADEA and should be accorded a similar interpretation.” Accordingly, Lowrey did not announce a sole causation standard for Title IX retaliation claims; it suggested that the causation standard for Title IX claims should be the same as the causation standard for Title VII claims while clarifying that complaints about conduct barred by Title VII could not form the basis of a Title IX claim.

Regardless, a new trial is not warranted because the district court’s instruction “substantially covered” the correct standard: that there must be a “causal connection” between the Title IX complaint and the adverse employment action. The district court gave the following instruction on the Title IX claim: