Page:Taylor-Travis v. Jackson State University (17-60856) (2021) Opinion.pdf/14

 its own policies by releasing the documents. However, this is a common-law invasion of privacy claim and not a claim for violation of the Mississippi Public Records Act. Regardless of the alleged statutory violation, Taylor still had to prove the elements of the claim she brought. Also, whether Jackson State violated its own policy has no bearing on whether the information it released constitutes a legitimate public concern. A public employee’s termination for, among other things, allegedly using public funds for private matters is a matter of legitimate concern to the public. The district court clearly erred in finding otherwise. Taylor’s privacy claim fails as a matter of law.

Taylor seeks a new trial on her Title IX retaliation claim, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it excluded her proposed jury instruction on causation. Taylor requested that the court give the jury a “but-for” causation instruction. She argues that the district erred when it instructed the jury that Taylor may prevail if the jury finds “that she was terminated solely as a consequence of complaints alleging noncompliance with the substantive provisions of Title IX.” As discussed above, to prevail on appeal, Taylor’s instruction must have been a correct statement of the law, not covered in the charge as a whole, and related to an important part of the trial that impaired her ability to present her claim.

The parties dedicate their briefs to discussing the continued validity of this court’s statement in Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System that plaintiffs may bring a retaliation claim under Title IX if an employee “suffer[s] unlawful retaliation solely as a consequence” of Title IX complaints. Taylor argues that the combination of three Supreme Court decisions overruled