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Corps, engaged at Colombey. The commander of the 26th Infantry Brigade received orders from the commanding general to engage. It was not necessary for the brigade to provide its own reserve as the 25th Brigade had been directed to concentrate between Marsilly and Colligny, and to be at the disposal of the corps commander. The troops already engaged were in a critical situation; their moral and physical energy was exhausted. It is only too patent that the first battalion (1st Battalion, 13th Infantry) appearing on the scene was thrown into the fight to afford at least temporary relief, but this insufficient reinforcement was involved in the general failure. After about a quarter of an hour, the 25th Brigade (the IIIrd Battallion, 73rd Infantry had remained in bivouac at Pange) was concentrating for action at Coincy, but, instead of its making a united attack, only the 1st Battalion of the 73rd Infantry was launched. This battalion did, indeed, penetrate into the "Tannenwäldchen" at the "Todten-Allee", but was then surrounded on three sides, had to fall back with considerable losses, prevented the further advance of the IInd Battallion of the 73rd Infantry, and rallied on the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry, on the bank of the Vallières brook. "Although the General Staff account of the war is silent on this subject, we are justified in assuming that only the presence of the brigade commander, who had learned a lesson from the second local assault, prevented the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry from making a fourth isolated effort. After re-forming the organizations, the new attack, which was made with indomitable spirit, proceeded more in connection with that of three other battalions advancing on the same line, and this united advance was closely followed by a second echelon consisting of the last battalion of the brigade (the IInd Battalion of the 13th Infantry), which had arrived just in time. The result was that the enemy was completely routed."

2. At the Gorze-Rezonville road, on August 16th, 1870, the isolated attacks made against Hill 970 by eight battalions, belonging to three different brigades, likewise accomplished nothing, whereas, had a higher commander been present, a united attack launched by him would undoubtedly have been successful.

3. The well executed attack made against the hill west of the suburb of St. Martin, on January 19th, 1871, by six battalions of the 29th Infantry Brigade shows the importance of the united launching of a large body of massed infantry. The engagement of the 16th Infantry Division, in particular the attack made on Grugies (battle of St. Quentin) is the antithesis of the above-mentioned attack. Although the situation did not necessitate the simultaneous launching of the available forces, the brigade attacked in driblets. The attack made by these fractions, launched one after another, was not able to bring about a decision. In the first place, at about 11 A. M., three companies (5th, 6th, and 7th of the 69th