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In contrast with this, Russia (1904): "In employing the general reserve, the commander-in-chief must be even more economical than the troop leader; he should, when necessary, detail single units to support this or that section, but he should in no case use up his whole reserve before the decision has occurred." The failures of the British in the South African war may likewise be traced in part to a faulty use of the reserves. Thus, we read in the regulations of 1896: "The reserve should occupy a favorable defensive position in order to check the enemy in case of defeat; if the attack succeeds, the reserve should move up into the position and take charge of the pursuit.

"Troops that give up a fight are like the swimmer who, after having made the most inconceivable exertions to swim across a broad, deep river, shrinks from the last spurt and drowns, although he need only stretch out his arm to reach the opposite shore." .

In employing the reserve, it should be remembered that the whole available force must be launched at the decisive moment at the decisive point, and that the commander ought not to detach portions of the force intended for the decisive blow for tasks of secondary importance.

The launching of L'Estocq's Corps at Preussisch-Eylau, is still a model worthy of imitation.

In the battle of Vionville, three battalions and four batteries were detached from the 20th Infantry Division, which had arrived during the afternoon, and sent to the right flank to take part in the action of the 5th Infantry Division, as infantry support seemed necessary on the right flank. When the head of the division reached Tronville, the question was discussed, as to whether it was desirable first to concentrate the division for action, or to throw the leading battalions into the Tronville forest, where portions of Lehman's Brigade were still holding their ground. As an advance of the French out of the woods would have endangered the left flank of the Prussian artillery line, three battalions were at once thrown into the forest, while the six remaining battalions were kept in reserve for the time being. Subsequently, three more battalions were sent forward to reinforce the infantry engaged in the forest