Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/399

 sustained by the Prussian troops on the slopes of Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870, may be traced directly to the fact that the leaders did not know how to wait.

Superiority of fire is absolutely essential to the success of the attack. Any failure to appreciate this principle will lead to such heavy losses that even if the assailant were to reach the enemy's position, he would be too weak to gain the victory.

During the fluctuating fire fight, which lasts for hours, the attacker will have succeeded in working forward little by little until he is close to the enemy's position. His superiority will now make itself felt; the fire from the part of the hostile line that is to be penetrated will begin to abate; and, at first, single groups, then several, and finally, whole units of the enemy's line will commence to crumble away. The attacker should wait until this effect is produced before he begins the assault; if he does not do this, the attack is sure to fail.

Austria. (Par. 590 I. D. R.). "The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant's superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances, furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature assault may still result in disaster. As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of fire."

Even in this, mistakes are not precluded. It is far from easy to recognize when the defender of a position has been sufficiently subdued by fire to make an assault feasible, and