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 consequence thereof surprises were not rare. Frequently a gap occurred in the reconnoitering line when the cavalry in front of the various parts of the army was brushed aside and the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened, cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly to the infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route columns, but this expedient was only partially successful. It must be remembered that troopers cannot ride close enough to the enemy to see anything of importance, and that they frequently are in ignorance of the very things which are of value for the infantry. In addition, the divisional cavalry is entirely too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to it. Therefore infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry reconnaissance. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of providing for its own reconnaissance.

The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in the fact that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its mounted officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate duties except for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for carrying messages; and that, if officers carry messages in person, the reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account of the slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages quickly, and, as a result, such messages frequently arrive too late to be of any value. On the other hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in that, by utilizing cover, they can get close to the enemy without being observed. The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than it was in the past, because troops can no longer change front when deployed, and because those which come under hostile fire while in close order formations may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses.

In the South African war the British infantry was frequently placed in difficult situations by the suddenly delivered fire of the Boers (Magersfontain, Colenso), which induced it to deploy all of its lines on a wide front at an early moment.