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At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the Roten Berg of the Spicheren Heights, it being assumed that only insignificant hostile forces were in front. The other brigade of the 14th Division was expected to be able to take part in the action in about three hours. When the attacking force was 2000 m. from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the IIIrd Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against the French right flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of the 74th Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly covered a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten Berg was undoubtedly difficult, this wide extension, which made all leading impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the first place, the brigade commander led his two reserve battalions against the Roten Berg and fell finally while leading a company. The brigade was too weak to carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th Brigade, which followed, came into action at various points of the battlefield, so that the two brigades became mixed, thus considerably increasing the difficulties of leading. At 3 P. M., the following troops were in the first line on the right wing:

I. Bn. II. Bn. 1. 2. and 1/23. Cos. 4. and 1. Cos. 10. 11. and 12. Cos. 1/23. Co.  -  - 53. Inf. 74. Inf. 74. Inf. 77. Inf. 39. Inf. 74. Inf.

The following troops were in the second line:

Füsilier Bn. 2. and 3. Cos. II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn. - 53. Inf. 77. Inf. 77. Inf.

This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. might have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the Giefert Wald—39-2/3 companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th and 74th Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600 m. It is true, the peculiar situation existing on the German side, operated against a simultaneous employment of the several bodies and a mixing of units was unavoidable, but it would undoubtedly have been possible to prevent such a complete dissolution of all units, by François' Brigade taking up a more suitable formation before the action commenced. The mistake made here