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as a rule, result in widening the front of the advancing force, even though this be only to the extent of placing columns abreast of each other. Hourly halts are to be made, so as to give an opportunity for replenishing ammunition and time for reconnaissance. Small columns are preferred in woods and in close country and larger columns on passable ground. Attention is specially called to the danger to which troops are exposed when surprised in defiles by hostile fire. This march to the battlefield is followed by a concentration of the troops in concealed and protected positions.

The deployment for action (Entwicklung) consists of forming the troops for battle and includes the extension into line of skirmishers. As a rule, the deployment follows the development for action, but may be made directly from route column or from an assembly formation.

It is impossible to define clearly where the development for action ceases and where the deployment begins. The formation of a line of skirmishers to cover a route column does not constitute a deployment. There is no room for doubt that the regulations have in mind the rencontre, in which the passage from route column to skirmish line proceeds naturally and smoothly. In attacking an enemy prepared to defend a position, the procedure is much more cautious. In this case the force which has been developed for action is withdrawn as much as possible from the view and the fire of the enemy (par. 367 German I. D. R.), and led forward from cover to cover. (Par. 369 German I. D. R.). Even in situations in which haste is required, it is a good plan to follow the procedure laid down by the regulations, viz: "First direct the troops upon the proper objective, then give them a suitable formation."

An analysis of the question as to whether an immediate launching of troops into action is necessary (5th Infantry Division at Vionville) or whether they should first be regularly concentrated (6th Infantry Division at Vionville) is of special interest. The concentration of the 1st Prussian Army Corps at Waterloo, and of the 5th Bavarian Infantry Brigade at Nehweiler (Wörth), almost in rear of the French, is justly criticised. At Nachod, the Austrian brigades, owing to their time-consuming concentration, lost an opportunity of throwing the weak Prussian advanced troops from the heights south of Wysokow, while the latter were reinforced by