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 such combat regulations are called "drill attack" (Schulangriff), many of the objections advanced against the normal attack are eliminated. Such definite provisions facilitate in a great measure the intercourse between leader and troops.

"Instructions as to what to do in battle," says Clausewitz (On War, II), "must not be taken for more than they are; they should not be regarded as hard and fast rules or systems, but merely as good general forms which individual judgment can utilize as is most suitable By means of a uniform method, commanders attain skill, precision, and confidence, the possession of which qualities on their part will make the whole machine run easier

"The drawback is that the habit of acting in a certain groove tends to become fixed and thus antiquated while the attendant circumstances imperceptibly change, and this should be prevented by enlightened and thorough criticism. When, in the year 1806, the Prussian generals (Prince Louis at Saalfeld; Tauenzien on the Dornberg at Jena; Grawert in front of and Rüchel in rear of Kapellendorf) without exception came to grief by employing Frederick the Great's system of tactics, it was due not merely to the fact that they had gotten into a certain groove of acting which was out of date, but to the most dire poverty of resource to which a fixed system of tactics has ever led. Owing to this incapacity of thinking for themselves, they involved Hohenlohe's army in such ruin as has never before or since overtaken any army on the battlefield."

General von Boguslawski demands that the conduct of the attack be regulated by precise instructions both on the drill-ground and in action. He states: "The many different methods of dealing with even the simplest cases, unquestionably evident in the army at the present time, are an evil calculated not only to train but also to confuse the soldier and the subordinate leader. Precise regulations are by no means incompatible with adaptation to the varying features of the terrain in a given case, and will infuse unity and certainty into offensive movements. A normal formation must be prescribed, but it should be flexible."

Elsewhere he makes the following statement in regard to a normal attack: "I believe that the normal attack should be regarded as the basis of troop training—a solid foundation for further development. In carrying out the spirit of this procedure, further work should be done on varied ground. This spirit aims at the unity of the attack. The formations taught on the drill-ground should be retained as long as possible. The training of officers and men must be such, however, that they will deviate, whenever necessary, from these normal formations. But if the formations, as well as the training and drill, are truly practical and adapted for war, departures from the scheme laid down in the regulations will be insignificant. This, briefly, is my idea of the normal attack or uniform