Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/217



At Magersfontain, (December 11th, 1899) the British lost 13% of their total strength; the Brigade of Highlanders, 23% (39% of the officers; i.e., 1 officer for every 14.9 men); the IInd Battalion of the Black Watch, 42%, and the IInd Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders, 23.9%. At Colenso (Dec. 15th, 1899) the British lost 6.4% of their total strength; the IInd Battalion of the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 23.9%.

Spionskop (Jan. 24th, 1900):

Attacking troops 2,694 men in 18-1/2 hrs. 40 officers, 721 men = 28.2% Supports         1,600  "  "  10-1/2  "    8   "        95  "  =  6.4% Reserves          1,500  "  "   4-1/2  "   15   "       170  "  = 12.3% Staffs                             5   "       —-                         -                  5,794 men                68 officers. 986 men = 17.5%

This action illustrates strikingly how rapidly the officers directing the fire were shot down.

Attacking troops 1 officer for every  18 men Supports         1   "     "     "    12  " Reserves         1   "     "     "    11  " -                 1 officer for every  14 men

For the purpose of comparison, we should like to mention that the Prussian Grenadier Battalion "von Wedel," consisting of 12 officers and 390 men, lost 10 officers and 301 men (77%) in about one hour during the battle of Soor (Sept. 30th, 1745). The losses suffered by the Grenadier Battalion "von Münchow" at Kesselsdorf are possibly not much lower. The effective strength of the last named battalion is not given; it lost 5 officers and 371 men.

At Kolin, the Grenadier Battalion "Nymschöfsky" lost 652 men, and six infantry regiments lost between 900 and 1188 men, i.e., considerably more than 50% of their strength. Two days after the battle, the Grenadier Battalion "Nymschöfsky" numbered only 24 men and the enlisted strength of six infantry regiments was 233, 296, 602, 651 and 711 men respectively. The number of stragglers was undoubtedly very great. At Kolin, the infantry lost in all 12,307 men out of 19,000, i. e., 65%.

The losses among officers are especially heavy. This is by no means due to the attempt of the hostile skirmishers to pick off the leaders in the combat at short range, but to the fact that, in order to lead their men, officers must expose themselves. This becomes more and more necessary the greater the moral effect of the combat on the nervous systems of the men,