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 In extended order the soldier's position is not definitely fixed; he is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead, judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the skirmisher.

The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.

In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled

400 men) from infantry fire at 1000 to 1200 m. "The impression produced was so overpowering that the commands for extending and deploying could not be executed at all and that the half-battalion had to be withdrawn in rear of the cemetery where it was assembled by the three officers still remaining." Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35, p. 23.
 * [Footnote: suffered in five minutes a loss of 9 officers and 150 men (out of a total of about

In cases where troops appeared in close order each losses were not at all exceptional.

On August 18th, 1870, the Füsilier-Battalion of the 85th Infantry, advancing from Vernéville, at first in double column, then in half-battalion column, to within 400 paces of the enemy, lost 12 officers, 32 non-commissioned officers, and 437 men killed and wounded (52%) in 20 minutes by the cross-fire of hostile artillery and mitrailleuse batteries. At 800 paces from the enemy the fragments of the battalion were assembled in three platoons. Gen. St. W., II, p. 724 ''Der 18. August'', p. 152.

The success of the bayonet attack made by the 9th Company of the 29th Infantry at St. Quentin may be explained by the inferiority of the opponent. ''Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 29'', p. 499.]