Page:Türkiye Halk Bankasi A.Ş. v. United States.pdf/8

Rh We disagree with Halkbank’s reading of our precedents. The case on which Halkbank primarily relies, Schooner Exchange, indeed held that a district court lacked “jurisdiction” over a suit claiming ownership of a French warship docked in a Philadelphia port. 7 Cranch, at 146–147. But Schooner Exchange did not address statutory subject matter jurisdiction. Instead, as this Court has since explained, Schooner Exchange concerned principles of foreign sovereign immunity that “developed as a matter of common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010). Contrary to Halkbank’s contention, the common-law sovereign immunity recognized in Schooner Exchange is a “rule of substantive law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts,” not an exception to a general statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U. S. 30, 36 (1945); see also Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 587–588 (1943).

In sum, the District Court has jurisdiction under 18 U. S. C. §3231 over this criminal prosecution.

Relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Halkbank contends that it enjoys immunity from criminal prosecution. We disagree because the Act does not provide foreign states and their instrumentalities with immunity from criminal proceedings.

The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity originally developed in U. S. courts “as a matter of common law” rather than by statute. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010). In determining whether to allow suits against foreign sovereigns, however, courts traditionally “deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch.” Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983); see also Rubin