Page:Türkiye Halk Bankasi A.Ş. v. United States.pdf/24

Rh criminal actions. Besides, even if the Court’s premise were correct and §1605’s exceptions (somehow) applied only in civil actions, what would that prove? It might simply mean that Congress wanted a more generous immunity from criminal proceedings than civil suits.

Finally, the Court points to the FSIA’s provisions regulating the venue and removal of civil actions against foreign sovereigns. Ante, at 7–8 (discussing §§1391(f) and 1441(d)). But once more, it seems to me this shows only that Congress knew how to speak specifically to civil suits when it wished to do so. Congress may have had reason to be especially concerned about the venue for civil suits too, given that almost all efforts to hale foreign sovereigns into U. S. courts have involved civil claims. Indeed, the parties and their amici struggled to find examples of criminal charges brought against foreign sovereigns either before or after the FSIA’s adoption—not only in the United States, but in any country. Compare Brief for United States 25–26 with Reply Brief 7–9. I might be willing to spot the Court that the venue and removal provisions could help illuminate §1604’s scope if that statute were ambiguous. But no one suggests that we have anything like that here. Section 1604 is as clear as a bell and we must abide by its direction that foreign sovereigns “shall be immune” absent some express statutory exception.

After declaring that the FSIA applies only to civil suits, the Court holds that “the common law” controls the disposition of any claim of foreign sovereign immunity in criminal cases. Ante, at 15. Yet rather than decide whether the common law shields Halkbank from this suit, the Court shunts the case back to the Second Circuit to figure that out. All of which leaves litigants and our lower court colleagues with an unenviable task, both in this case and others sure to emerge. Many thorny questions lie down the