Page:Türkiye Halk Bankasi A.Ş. v. United States.pdf/16

Rh “grants of subject-matter jurisdiction in Title 28”—that is, in civil cases against foreign states. 488 U. S., at 437 (citing 28 U. S. C. §§1331, 1333, 1335, 1337, 1338). The Court had no occasion to consider the FSIA’s implications for Title 18’s grant of criminal jurisdiction over “all” federal criminal offenses. 18 U. S. C. §3231.

At any rate, Amerada Hess’s rationale does not translate to the criminal context. The Court’s holding as to the nonapplicability of general civil jurisdictional grants was based on the FSIA’s own civil jurisdictional grant and the “comprehensiveness” of the statutory scheme as to civil matters. 488 U. S., at 434–435, and n. 3, 437 (citing 28 U. S. C. §1330(a)). But the FSIA contains no grant of criminal jurisdiction and says nothing about criminal matters—a distinct legal regime housed in an entirely separate title of the U. S. Code. The FSIA did not implicitly repeal or modify 18 U. S. C. §3231’s core grant of criminal jurisdiction.

Second, Halkbank warns that courts and the Executive will lack “congressional guidance” as to procedure in criminal cases if we conclude that the FSIA does not apply in the criminal context. Brief for Petitioner 37. But that concern carried no weight in Samantar, which likewise deemed the FSIA’s various procedures inapplicable to a specific category of cases—there, suits against foreign officials. In any event, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would govern any federal criminal proceedings. And although Halkbank argues that Congress would not have been “indifferent” to criminal jury trials involving instrumentalities of foreign states, id., at 38, juries already resolve similarly sensitive cases against foreign officials after Samantar.

Third, Halkbank briefly raises a consequentialist argument. According to Halkbank, if the FSIA does not apply to criminal proceedings, then state prosecutors would also be free to commence criminal proceedings against