Page:Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect.pdf/46

34 I believe none will assert that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have, therefore, no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it.”

This passage is concerned with a notion of ‘substance,’ which I do not entertain. Thus it only indirectly controverts my position. I quote it because it is the plainest example of Hume’s initial assumptions that (i) presentational immediacy, and relations between presentationally immediate entities, constitute the only type of perceptive experience, and that (ii) presentational immediacy includes no demonstrative factors disclosing a contemporary world of extended actual things.

He discusses this question later in his ‘Treatise’ under the heading of the notion of ‘Bodies’; and arrives at analogous sceptical conclusions. These conclusions rest upon an extraordinary naïve assumption of time as pure succession. The assump-