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160 sound even to a philosophical ear! and yet it is copied from a work published little more than seventy years ago, by the learned and judicious Gravesande: “” ''Introd. ad Phil.'' § 19.

The Greek word 🇬🇷 (derived from the participle of 🇬🇷) is not liable to these objections. It obtrudes no sensible image on the fancy; and, in this respect, has a great advantage over the Latin word substantia. The former, in its logical acceptation, is an extension to Matter, of an idea originally derived from Mind. The latter is an extension to Mind of an idea originally derived from Matter.

Instead of defining mind to be a thinking substance, it seems much more logically correct to define it a thinking being. Perhaps it would be better still, to avoid, by the use of the pronoun that, any substantive whatever, “Mind is that which thinks, wills,” &c.

The foregoing remarks afford me an opportunity of exemplifying what I have elsewhere observed concerning the effects which the scholastic philosophy has left on the present habits of thinking, even of those who never cultivated that branch of learning. In consequence of the stress laid on the predicaments, men became accustomed in their youth to imagine, that, i order to know the nature of anything, it was sufficient to know under what predicament or category it ought to be arranged; and that, till this was done, it remained to our faculties a subject merely of ignorant wonder. Hence the impotent attempt to comprehend under some common name (such as that of substance) the heterogeneous existences of matter, of mind, and even of empty space; and hence the endless disputes to which the last of these words has given rise in the Schools.

In our own times, Kant and his followers seem to have thought, that they had thrown a new and strong light on the nature of space and also of time, when they introduced the word form (forms of the intellect) as a common term applicable to both. Is not this to revert to the scholastic folly of verbal generalization? And is it not evident, that of things which are unique (such as matter, mind, space, time) no classification is practicable? Indeed, to speak of classifying what has nothing in common with anything else, is a contradiction in terms. It was thus that St Augustine felt, when he said, “” His idea evidently was, that, although he annexed as clear and precise a notion to the word time, as he could do to any object of human thought, he was unable to find any term more general, under which it could be comprehended; and consequently, unable to give any definition, by which it might be explained.

, p. 89.

“Les Méditations de Descartes parûrent in 1641. C’étoit, de tous ses ouvrages, celui qu’il estimoit Ie plus. Ce qui characterise sur tout cet ouvrage, c’est qu’il contient sa fameuse démonstration de Dieu par l’idée, démonstration si répétée depuis, adoptée par les uns, et rejettée par les autres; et qu’il est le premier où la distinction de l’esprit et de la matière soit parfaitement développée, car avant Descartes on n’avoit encore bien approfondi les preuves philosophiques de le spiritualité de l’ame.” Eloge de Descartes, par M. Thomas. Note 20. 9