Page:Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.pdf/43

 and transport the supporting operatives into the U.S. and allow them to train and do any necessary surveillance. Sheikh Mohammed also said that he was consumed with the responsibilities of managing the 9/11 operation, and thus was unable to direct much attention to the second wave plot.

88. The earlier plan for a second wave attack ended with Moussaoui's arrest because without candidate pilots or operatives, he had to start over from scratch.

89. Sheikh Mohammed was impressed by the security measures implemented in the U.S. in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. Based on the U.S. reaction to the attacks and future plots to the U.S., Sheikh Mohammed assessed at least for the short term that the prospects for a second round of hijacking attacks in the U.S. were dismal. Sheikh Mohammed began to think about the need to get Moussaoui out of the U.S. before he was caught. It quickly became clear that Moussaoui was lost to al Qaeda when the news arrived on 9/12/01 that Moussaoui had been arrested in late August 2001.

90. Sheikh Mohammed said that in late 1999 he sent Moussaoui to Malaysia to get flight training. A member of the Hambali group would assist Page 42 of 58