Page:Studies of a Biographer 2.djvu/287

 to be believed to all hazards, even if He has not given reasons for belief, even therefore if the demand imply the grossest injustice. What is the chance that God, if there be a God, acts on this principle, and not on the opposite principle?

Pascal, logical as he is, seems to overlook this, and for a simple reason. The commands which God is supposed to give us on penalty of damnation, are not simple commands of morality, but commands of religion: we are commanded to worship Him, love Him, and promote His glory, and we cannot do so without believing in Him. The belief, then, is not so much directly ordered as indirectly implied in the practices ordered. Thus the distinction therefore, which I have suggested between conduct and belief, does not show itself. The heart is to obey the divine grace, and the obedience implies recognition of the source of grace. The mathematical view passes, therefore, into the mystical; and hence follows another famous conclusion. The Montaigne element makes a last rally. I am, it exclaims, a mere passive being; I am ordered to believe, but I am not free. I am so made that I cannot believe. What am I to do? Give me proofs and I may be persuaded. No, says Pascal, I cannot give you