Page:Studies in constitutional law Fr-En-US (1891).pdf/170

162

exceed the limits of a mere summary, if I followed out the chain of reasoning which I have begun to the very end. I must allow myself, however, to call attention to one or two more points in regard to the Constitutions of each of the three countries — points which have reference to the scope and objects of the sovereign power, to the spirit of the constitution, to its structure, and to its mode of growth.

We have noticed that in France the political equation, so to speak, consists of two terms only, the individual and the state, the infinitely small and the infinitely great. There is nothing between these two to attract attention. No coherent, solid, and well-tried organization gives consistency to any considerable interests, whether local or special. The local or special groups of yesterday’s growth are mere meeting places used by individuals for certain transactions of public life: they are lifeless figures, and not persons gifted with a consciousness and will of their own. The superior paramount interest of the nation stands face to face with the paltry selfishness of each individual citizen. The prodigious inequality in value between the only two living elements of political society produces this result. The philosopher, gazing down from the dreamlike heights of public power upon the crowd of human atoms, necessarily feels that he has the right