Page:Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.pdf/63

Rh sought to “make illegal all distinctions on account of color” because “there should be no distinction recognized by the laws of the land.” Id., at 819; see also 3 Cong. Rec., at 956 (statement of Rep. Cain) (“[M]en [are] formed of God equally …. The civil-rights bill simply declares this: that there shall be no discriminations between citizens of this land so far as the laws of the land are concerned”). The view of the Legislature was clear: The Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

The earliest Supreme Court opinions to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment did so in colorblind terms. Their statements characterizing the Amendment evidence its commitment to equal rights for all citizens, regardless of the color of their skin. See.

In the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873), the Court identified the “pervading purpose” of the Reconstruction Amendments as “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.” Id., at 67–72. Yet, the Court quickly acknowledged that the language of the Amendments did not suggest “that no one else but the negro can share in this protection.” Id., at 72. Rather, “[i]f Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, [the Thirteenth Amendment] may safely be trusted to make it void.” Ibid. And, similarly, “if other rights are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of African descent.” Ibid.