Page:Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.pdf/37

Rh 630, 647 (1993))).

Yet by accepting race-based admissions programs in which some students may obtain preferences on the basis of race alone, respondents’ programs tolerate the very thing that Grutter foreswore: stereotyping. The point of respondents’ admissions programs is that there is an inherent benefit in race qua race—in race for race’s sake. Respondents admit as much. Harvard’s admissions process rests on the pernicious stereotype that “a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.” Bakke, 438 U. S., at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at 92. UNC is much the same. It argues that race in itself “says [something] about who you are.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707, at 97; see also id., at 96 (analogizing being of a certain race to being from a rural area).

We have time and again forcefully rejected the notion that government actors may intentionally allocate preference to those “who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin.” Shaw, 509 U. S., at 647. The entire point of the Equal Protection Clause is that treating someone differently because of their skin color is not like treating them differently because they are from a city or from a suburb, or because they play the violin poorly or well.

“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.” Rice, 528 U. S., at 517. But when a university admits students “on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a particular race, because of their race, think alike,” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911–912 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)—at the very least alike in the sense of being different from nonminority students. In