Page:Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.pdf/165

26 a blind eye to these truths and overruling decades of precedent, “content for now to disguise” its ruling as an application of “established law and move on.” Kennedy, 597 U. S., at ___ (, dissenting) (slip op., at 29). As puts it, “Grutter is, for all intents and purposes, overruled.”

It is a disturbing feature of today’s decision that the Court does not even attempt to make the extraordinary showing required by stare decisis. The Court simply moves the goalposts, upsetting settled expectations and throwing admissions programs nationwide into turmoil. In the end, however, it is clear why the Court is forced to change the rules of the game to reach its desired outcome: Under a faithful application of the Court’s settled legal framework, Harvard and UNC’s admissions programs are constitutional and comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq. The same standard that applies under the Equal Protection Clause guides the Court’s review under Title VI, as the majority correctly recognizes. See ; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 325 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring). argues that “Title VI bears independent force” and holds universities to an even higher standard than the Equal Protection Clause. Because no party advances ’s argument, see, the Court properly declines to address it under basic principles of party presentation. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 3). Indeed, ’s approach calls for even more judicial restraint. If petitioner could prevail under ’s statutory analysis, there would be no reason for this Court to reach the constitutional question. See Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam). In a statutory case, moreover, stare decisis carries “enhanced force,” as it would be up to Congress to “correct any mistake it sees” with “our interpretive decisions.” Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). wonders why the dissent, like the majority, does not “engage” with his statutory arguments. The answer is simple: This Court plays “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U. S. 237, 243 (2008). Petitioner made a