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 by each side, and, with the premises which I here suppose, it is the best means of closing the controversy. But if a settlement is often so difficult to effect; if, as not infrequently happens, both parties from the first decline all negotiations tending to a settlement, the reason is not simply that the calculations of probabilities by the two parties diverge too much from each other to be able to meet, but because each of the parties to the controversy supposes the other to be consciously wrong, moved by an evil intent. Thus the question assumes, even when agitated from the standpoint of a suit at law, under the form of an objective injustice (reivindicatio), psychologically, for the party, the very same shape as in the case above—the shape of a conscious violation of one’s right or of law; and the stubbornness with which the individual here