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Rh the powers of the departments of the government, in the enact, the interpretation, and the execution of laws.

That an accused is entitled to a speedy trial, is a proposition which no one will question; but what is a speedy trial, and what consequence will follow as sanction, where a speedy trial is denied, are questions that have to be considered with reference to the existing law, and its practical operation, in the determination of individual rights.

In the case of Nixon vs. The State, (2 S. & M. 507,) upon habeas corpus, where the Prisoner, who stood indicted for murder, claimed his discharge under a similar constitutional provision of that State, by reason of the alleged delays in bringing him to trial, the court there make the following just observations: "One who is prosecuted by indictment, has by the constitution his right to a speedy and impartial trial. He shall not be unnecessarily hindered and delayed in his efforts to relieve himself from the burthen of a charge of crime. But the constitution also declares that he shall not be deprived of his life or liberty, but by due course of law. Delays growing out of the established mode of proceeding, which has been so established by law equally for the protection of the accused, and to accomplish the design of the scheme of laws, are evils necessarily attendant upon all human systems of jurisprudence. They are evils to which all may be subjected alike, and which constitute a part of the price paid for the advantages, far greater in proportion, thereby derived. By a speedy trial, is then intended, a trial conducted according to fixed rules, regulations, and proceedings of law, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, manufactured by the ministers of justice." The discharge was refused. In that case, one of the grounds relied upon, was, that at the term at which he was indicted, the prisoner demanded his trial, but at the same time insisted upon his right to an examination of the indictment "at least two entire days before the trial." This would have rendered it impossible to go into the trial until some time on Saturday, the last day of the term, as limited by statute. The court held this not to be an unreasonable delay, within the spirit of