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Rh Also, it is more than passing strange that the majority has just now decided to construe Ark. Const. art. 2, § 15 differently, since Arkansas' constitutional provision is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment. Because article 2, § 15 is almost identical to the language found in the Fourth Amendment, our court in past decisions has justifiably and reasonably adopted the same Fourth Amendment analysis used by the United States Supreme Court and the federal appellate courts when considering search and seizure issues. As a consequence, this court's decisions interpreting art. 2, § 15 have become a part of that constitutional provision. See Nelson v. Timberline Int'l, Inc., 332 Ark. 165, 964 S.W.2d 357 (1998) (when a constitutional provision or a statute has been construed, and that construction is consistently followed for many years, such construction should not be changed) (emphasis added); Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993) (the interpretation given a statute becomes a part of the statute itself). In giving art. 2, § 15 a different interpretation than this court has done in past years, the court, once again, overlooks or ignores its own precedent.

Finally, it is especially noteworthy to mention the case of Stout v. State, 320 Ark. 552, 898 S.W.2d 457 (1995). There, this court emphasized the similar wording of art. 2, § 15 and the Fourth Amendment, and specifically held that, in search and seizure conflicts, the court will construe our Constitution in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation. The majority attempts to sidestep Stout by stating that case involved a motor vehicle and not a residence as in the case now before us. The majority court fails to cite any case law for such an interpretation. In short, the cases cited above in this opinion have construed art. 2, § 15 to cover both motor vehicles and homes.