Page:State ex rel. Bryant v. R & A Investment Co.pdf/2

290 a case upon which appellees relied for their assertion that the attorney general lacked standing to enforce the constitution's usury provisions, noting that in this case the State was not bringing a personal claim for usury; the supreme court declined to condone appellees' open, flagrant, and continuous violation of the Arkansas Constitution.
 * 1) S –  – . – The basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretive guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature; when a statute is clear, it is given its plain meaning, and the supreme court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used; the court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent; in interpreting a statute and attempting to construe legislative intent, the supreme court looks to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative history, and other appropriate means that throw light on the subject; changes made by subsequent amendments may be helpful in determining legislative intent.
 * 2) B – D T P A – . – The preamble to Act 92 of 1971 reveals that the legislature's remedial purpose was "to protect the interests of both the consumer public and the legitimate business community"; the words "and unconscionable" were added to Ark. Code Ann. § 4-88-107(a) and (b) by Act 587 of 1993; section 4-88-107(b) illustrates that lib.eral construction of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) is appropriate, as it provides that "[t]he deceptive and unconscionable trade practices listed in this section are in addition to and do not limit the types of unfair trade practices actionable at common law or under other statutes of this state"; thus, the supreme court rejected appellees' contention that section 4-88-107(a)(10), which prohibits "any other unconscionable, false, deceptive act or practice," was too vague for enforcement, noting that the catch-all provision was undoubtedly included because the General Assembly could not be expected to envision every conceivable violation under the DTPA.
 * 3) C –  – . – In assessing whether a particular contract or provision is unconscionable, the courts should review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the negotiation and execution of the contract; two