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 tions; the people would obey, or not, as their interests and feelings might dictate. The courts of the several states partake, too readily of local jealousies and excitements, to be entrusted with the final determination of questions involving the validity or construction of the federal laws ; and questions of policy of much less importance than those that now agitate our country, would soon put an end to our ephemeral Union. The judicial department, therefore constitutes one of those peculiarities, which distinguish the present government from the old confederation — a co-ordinate branch — which, in the opinion of youi committee, is absolutely necessary for the successful organization of our government.

It being one of the first principles of a republic, that the legislative and judicial departments be kept entirely distinct, the patriot has nothing to apprehend from the power or ambition of the courts. Speaking of the three great departments, an eminent civilian says, "the judiciary is next to nothing." It has indeed no power over the wealth or strength of the nation. It has neither force nor will, but merely judgment, and can not enforce even that, without the aid of the executive. * * * An independent judiciary is absolutely indispensable, for the protection of the people in their reserved rights, and for the preservation of every department of the government in its appropriate and destined action. It is indeed the great balance wheel of the Constitution ; which from its own weakness needs, and its inestimable value deserves the constant care and vigilance of the community, to protect it from the attacks of the other departments of the government, both state and federal. * * »

Resolved, [Here follows quotation from Art. VI, § 2, of U. S. Const.]

Resolved, That we regard the judicial department of the government of the United States, as sacred in its origin, and invaluable in its purposes and objects, as either the executive or legislative departments; and we also regard the designs of any community, to destroy it, or to paralyze its influence, among the people of these states, as the manifestation of feelings, unfriendly to the permanent interests of our common country.

[From Copy in the Journal of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, 1831-32, 11,41-43.]