Page:Starz Entertainment v. MGM Domestic Television Distribution.pdf/5

 , 572 U.S. at 670, 134 S.Ct. 1962, i.e., when the infringer “violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner,” Bell v. Wilmott Storage Servs., LLC, 12 F.4th 1065, 1080 (9th Cir. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)), although this is not the only time a claim accrues, as explained below.

In Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994), we addressed the situation of a continuing violation, where the copyright holder, Roley, had witnessed the original screening of a new movie in August 1987 that he claimed, at that time, infringed his screenplay. We held that a “cause of action for copyright infringement accrues when one has knowledge of a violation or is chargeable with such knowledge.” Id. at 481. But Roley did not file his complaint alleging infringement until February 1991. Id. at 480. He sought the benefit of the Seventh Circuit’s then view of the three-year limitation period, “that so long as any allegedly infringing conduct occurs within the three years preceding the filing of the action, the plaintiff may reach back and sue for damages or other relief for all allegedly infringing acts,” beginning when the first infringing act occurred, no matter how long ago. Id. at 481 (citing Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1983)). We squarely rejected that theory of recovery for continuing copyright violations, holding that Roley could recover only for infringing acts that occurred within the three years preceding the filing of the copyright infringement lawsuit. Id. Thus, as early as 1994, we both recognized the discovery rule in the "specific context of cases where infringement and accrual happen simultaneously," and that when the copyright holder knew of earlier infringing acts, recovery was allowable only for infringing acts occurring within the three-year window before commencing suit.

Our subsequent decision in Polar Bear Productions, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended), recognized the latter point—that Roley did not create a bar against recovery for acts of infringement that occurred prior to the three-year window. Rather, Roley held that a claim accrues at “the moment when the copyright holder ‘has knowledge of a violation or is chargeable with such knowledge,’ ” and therefore “the three-year clock begins upon discovery of the infringement.” Id. at 706 (quoting Roley, 19 F.3d at 481). Therefore, under Roley, § 507(b) does not prohibit the recovery of damages for infringing acts that occurred outside the three-year window so long as “the copyright plaintiff was unaware of the infringement, and that lack of knowledge was reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. We reasoned: "Without the benefit of tolling in this situation, a copyright plaintiff who, through no fault of its own, discovers an act of infringement more than three years after the infringement occurred would be out of luck. Such a harsh rule would distort the tenor of the statute. Section 507(b), like all statutes of limitations, is primarily intended to promote the timely prosecution of grievances and discourage needless delay. It makes little sense, then, to bar damages recovery by copyright holders who have no knowledge of the infringement…."

Id. In other words, a claim for copyright infringement may accrue when the copyright owner discovers, or reasonably