Page:Starz Entertainment v. MGM Domestic Television Distribution.pdf/10

 167 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1092–93 (C.D. Cal. 2016); ''UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Glob. Eagle Ent., Inc., No. CV 14-3466 MMM (JPRx), 2015 WL 12752881, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015); Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00106-LRH-PAL, 2015 WL 5089779, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2015); Richardson v. Kharbouch, No. 19-C-02321, 2020 WL 1445629, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2020); Design Basics, LLC v. Forrester Wehrle Homes, Inc.'', 305 F. Supp. 3d 788, 792–94 (N.D. Ohio 2018); ''Energy Intel. Grp., Inc. v. CHS McPherson Refinery, Inc.'', 300 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1371 (D. Kan. 2018); Krist v. Scholastic, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 804, 811–12, 812 n.44 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Mitchell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 677–78; Design Basics, LLC v. McNaughton Co., No. 3:17-cv-258, 2017 WL 11068761, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017); Boehm v. Svehla, No. 15-cv-379-jdp, 2017 WL 4326308, at *8–9 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 27, 2017); Topline Sols., Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., No. ELH-09-3102, 2017 WL 1862445, at *21 (D. Md. May 8, 2017); Alfa Laval Inc. v. Flowtrend, Inc., No. H-14-2597, 2016 WL 2625068, at *5–6 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 2016); ''Energy Intel. Grp., Inc. v. Kayne Anderson Cap. Advisors, LP, No. H-14-1903, 2016 WL 1203763, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2016); Raucci v. Candy & Toy Factory'', 145 F. Supp. 3d 440, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Design Basics LLC v. J & V Roberts Invs., Inc., 130 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1281–82 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Design Basics LLC v. Campbellsport Bldg. Supply Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 899, 919 (E.D. Wis. 2015); Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 3d 399, 410–11 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Frerck v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3d 882, 887 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Beasley v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 3d 937, 945 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2014); ''Panoramic Stock Images, Ltd. v. McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings, LLC, No. 12 C-9881, 2014 WL 6685454, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2014); Frerck v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.'', No. 11-cv-2727, 2014 WL 3512991, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014). The Supreme Court did not create a damages bar separate from the statute of limitations in Petrella. The language that MGM relies on in Petrella is relevant only to incident of injury rule cases, not to cases where we apply the discovery rule. MGM relies, like the Second Circuit in Sohm, on the Petrella Court’s statement that “the statute ‘itself takes account of delay’ by limiting damages to the three years prior to when a suit is filed.” Sohm, 959 F.3d at 52 (quoting Petrella, 572 U.S. at 677, 134 S.Ct. 1962). This statement is accurate when the incident of injury rule applies because the three-year look-back period from the date of filing suit is coextensive with the three-year period following the act of infringement. When accrual is triggered by the act of infringement, we can accurately describe the statute of limitations as running forward from the act of infringement or looking backward from the date the complaint is filed—either way it is the same exact period of time.

MGM argues that Petrella’s “look-back” language created a three-year damages bar that is determined solely by the date the complaint is filed even in cases where the discovery rule applies. But the text of the statute provides no support for this argument. In Petrella, the Court explained that, in the Copyright Act, Congress provided for just “two controlling time prescriptions: the copyright term … and § 507(b)’s limitations period.” Petrella, 572 U.S. at 672, 134 S.Ct. 1962. Section 507(b)’s limitation period is not based on the date the complaint is filed, but instead limits civil actions to “three years after the claim accrued.” In other words, the claim under the Copyright Act does not arise—is not even actionable—until accrual. Nowhere in § 507(b), or anywhere else in the Copyright Act, is there any reference to a separate three-year damages bar based on the complaint’s filing date. The Court did not disregard the plain text of the Copyright Act and invent a third time