Page:Stabilizing the dollar, Fisher, 1920.djvu/236

182 international standardization of monetary units and that, therefore, we need not trouble ourselves about attempting the impossible. But, as one will see by reading H. B. Russell's book on "International Monetary Conferences," when the proposal to resume bimetallism was made there was a special obstacle which would not exist in the case of the stabilization plan. This obstacle was the realization, based on the experience of the Latin Union, that when any nation or nations have bimetallism in successful operation, all the other nations enjoy its benefits as much as if they had it themselves but without the trouble or responsibility of operating it. For instance, the Latin Union had, as an intermediary between the gold standard countries and the silver standard countries, virtually held together the rupee and the pound sterling in a fixed ratio to the great benefit of England without effort on her part. Under such conditions, for a long time after bimetallism broke down in 1873, almost every nation wanted some other nation to restore it but wanted, if possible, to avoid doing so for itself! In modern slang each would "let George do it."

In the case of the standardized dollar, on the other hand, if one nation should break the inertia of custom and adopt the plan, and if it were soon seen that this nation was getting benefits from it while all the other nations lacked these benefits and, in fact, were being somewhat injured by the upset in their exchange pars, these other nations would soon want to come in, as the only way to escape the evils and secure the benefits. The case would be analogous, not to the reluctant attitude toward international bimetallism, but to the "scramble" of nations to get on to the gold standard. After the breakdown of bimetallism in 1873 commercial nations turned, one after another, to the gold standard in order to secure the advantage of a stable rate of exchange on London and other important commercial centers.