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136 the common will of society; since it would only be possible in special cases to decide accurately and truthfully where the limitation arising from a contract was such as actually to render him who has changed his wishes, a mere tool of the other. Lastly, it cannot be called imposing a boon, when we do away with the power of resigning it by anticipation.

The fundamental principles of right themselves establish it, and it has been already expressly laid clown, that no one can make a valid contract, or, in general, enter into any engagement with regard to anything save that which is really his property, that is, his actions or his possessions. It is evident moreover that the chief solicitude of the State for the security of its citizens (in so far as this is affected by the operation of contracts or engagements), consists in watching and maintaining the observance of this principle. Still there are certain entire departments of transaction to which this fundamental rule has not been applied. Such, for example, are all dispositions of property to be observed after the death of the disposer, whether they be made directly or indirectly, incidentally in another contract or in a special contract or testament, or in any disposition of whatever nature. Right of any kind can only relate immediately to the person: its relation to things is only conceivable in so far as these are connected with the person by actions. With the decease of the person, therefore, this right is also at an end. Hence, as long as he lives, man is free to dispose of his things as he pleases, to alienate them in part or altogether—their substance, use, or possession; and further, to limit his actions and the employment of his means by anticipation, according as he thinks good. But he is in no respect entitled to define, in any way binding on others, what shall be done with his property after his decease, or to determine how its future possessor is to act or not. I will