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 here, the preliminary injunction “would stay government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme,” the moving party “must satisfy the more rigorous prong of ‘likelihood of success’” at step two. ''Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y.'', 331 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2003).

The standard may be further heightened if “(i) an injunction would alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or (ii) an injunction will provide the movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits.” Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Ent., Inc., 60 F.3d 27, 33–34 (2d Cir. 1995). If either scenario applies, a plaintiff must show “a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits” at step two. See ''N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37 (internal quotations and citation omitted); Tom Doherty Assocs.'', 60 F.3d at 35.

When deciding whether an injunction is mandatory and would alter the status quo, the status quo is “the last actual, peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” ''N. Am. Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 37 (quoting Mastrio v. Sebelius'', 768 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)) (internal quotations omitted). The court also considers whether the injunction would “command[] some positive act”—rather than prohibit some act—by the defendant. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Tom Doherty Assocs., 60 F.3d at 34), An injunction that enjoins a defendant from enforcing a regulation “clearly prohibits, rather than compels, government action by enjoining the future enforcement.” Id. at 90.