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 “autonomy is the selection of the individuals who play certain key roles.” Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S.Ct. at 2060 (emphasis added). The Establishment Clause protects Plaintiffs’ conduct. Indeed, the place of worship exclusion encroaches on matters “closely linked” with the Church’s right to determine how best to conduct its own affairs. Our Lady of Guadalupe, 140 S.Ct. at 2061.

The Supreme Court instructs that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by ‘reference to historical practices and understandings.’” Kennedy, 142 S.Ct. at 2428 (quoting Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)). The “line that courts and governments must draw between the permissible and the impermissible has to accord with history and faithfully reflect the understanding of the Founding Fathers.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). An “analysis focused on original meaning and history, [the Supreme] Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some exception within the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).

On this record, the State fails to demonstrate that the houses of worship exclusion is consistent with the nation’s “historical practices and understandings.” Kennedy, 142 S.Ct. at 2428; Galloway, 572 U.S. at 576. Plaintiffs argue that, “[o]ver the decades, the Supreme Court has enforced the Establishment Clause’s guarantee of church autonomy to prevent state interference with religious doctrine and the line between orthodoxy and heresy, rules for church governance (or “ecclesiology”), appointing, removing, and fixing the authority of church leaders, the admission and