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 interest In preventing violent crime.” Dkt. 13-3, at 9. The State, however, fails to establish that the houses of worship exclusion is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. It argues that “in a sensitive location such as a religious institution, there is no narrower way to prevent” gun violence than “by ensuring that only trained individuals specifically tasked with protecting the community are armed.” The Court disagrees.

In an analogous case, the Supreme Court explained that “narrow tailoring requires the government to show that measures less restrictive of the First Amendment activity could not address its interest in reducing [gun violence].” Tandon, 141 S.Ct. at 1296–97. Where “the government permits other activities to proceed with precautions, it must show that the religious exercise at issue is more dangerous than those activities even when the same precautions are applied. Otherwise, precautions that suffice for other activities suffice for religious exercise too.” Id.

The State allows a broad swath of private property owners to decide whether to permit the otherwise-lawful carrying of firearms on their property. There is no evident justification for the view that secular business owners are more qualified than religious leaders to determine whether to allow armed self-defense on their property. Moreover, a bad-intentioned armed person looking to attack worshippers will not be deterred in the [sic] by the fact that the State can now add unlawful carry in a “sensitive location” to the slew of criminal charges that would stem from such an attack. The houses of worship exclusion is therefore not narrowly tailored to