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 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)).

In any event, the Church congregation includes—at most—only a handful of police officers or other individuals who might fit into a statutory exception. Even if these individuals were to volunteer to provide security at the Church, they could not conceivably protect the approximately 800 individuals who worship at the Church throughout each week—given that they have day jobs and “work a lot of hours.” And to the extent the Church hired private security guards or police officers to protect the congregation, the financial burden would necessarily reduce the amount of ministry the Church could perform. This is precisely the sort of meddling in religious practices that courts find time and again violates the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., ''Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Canada v. New York City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene'', 763 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 2014) (enjoining, at the request of Orthodox Jewish organizations, enforcement of city ordinance prohibiting any person from performing direct oral suction as part of circumcision without first obtaining signed written consent from one of the child’s parents as violative of the Free Exercise Clause). Further, like in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the State has not “questioned the sincerity” of Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs. See 508 U.S. at 531.

On these facts, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the State, by enacting the houses of worship exclusion, has burdened their sincere religious practices.