Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 6.djvu/311

Rh thought, “put upon,” he became very formidable. Neither was it possible to placate him.

This play of character in Grant, Fish, Sumner and Motley, I found immensely interesting in the preparation of my address. It was the thing which gave life and individuality to it. Meanwhile, I certainly had no thought of leaving the impression of a feeling of “contempt” for Sumner. His foibles were more pronounced than those of any other one of the quartette, unless, perchance, Motley. Motley, however, was a much less interesting character. He cut no considerable figure.

I shall, however, in passing the paper through the press now enlarge and qualify in such a way as to remove, if possible, the impression to which you refer. It is not easy; but I admit at once it should be done.

As to the matter of the chairmanship of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the propriety of the occupant thereof being in accord with the Administration, we do not in reality disagree. It is always easy to state an extreme case. You do it in this instance. Of course, a reasonable difference of opinion is always permissible, and especially in such a case as that in question, between members of the same party. They may occasionally disagree on matters of even first-class moment, and yet that afford no sufficient ground for a change. Therefore, when you speak as you do in your letter, I merely say that those are ordinary cases, not to be taken into consideration. They arise under all conditions.

Meanwhile, I will suggest an extreme case on the other side, and you will at once agree with me. Supposing the Chairman of that Committee was not on speaking terms with either the President or Secretary. Though belonging to the same party, he had a personal feeling, resulting, perhaps, from his being a rival candidate for the Presidency, which led him to desire to thwart the Administration policy at every point, and that he lost no occasion for denouncing it. Matters of foreign policy of the first importance were then sent by the Department of State to the Senate, and there immediately pigeonholed, or so amended as to defeat the purpose for which they were designed. All this is supposable.