Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 6.djvu/247

Rh in insurrection against Spanish misrule, just as the Cubans were—only that they were much stronger and far more successful in the field and had a far better organized and more efficient civil government. And what did they do? They valiantly fought against the Spaniards, whom Dewey designated to them as the “common enemy,” defeating them in many engagements and taking many thousands of them prisoners, until the interior of the country was well cleared of the common enemy and the main body of the Spaniards was cooped up in Manila, blockaded by our forces on the sea side and tightly hemmed in by the Filipinos on the land side, so that they could neither receive reinforcements nor escape into the interior. The Spanish commander mentioned this fact as one of the main reasons for the bloodless surrender of Manila. The high value of the services rendered by the Filipino army was officially testified to by several of our most respectable officers.

Now, when the time came for determining the future of the Philippines in the peace treaty with the “common enemy,” our President, having nothing but justice and humanity and civilization in his mind, of course promptly invited the Filipinos, who had rendered such good service against the “common enemy,” to acquaint him with their views and wishes? Any just and benevolent man would have been eager to do this. Alas, our President did not think of it. But when the Filipinos asked to be heard, he at least kindly gave them audience? No, not even that. He coldly turned his back upon them. And then, behind doors tightly shut against our Filipino allies, the President, through his Peace Commission, bargained with the defeated “common enemy,” from whom the Filipinos had wrested the interior of their native land, for the transfer of the Philippine Islanders at $2 a head from Spanish foreign rule to American foreign rule. And he did this