Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 5.djvu/543

Rh I would entreat you not to imagine that any half-way measures will relieve you of your troubles. The keeping of “only” the island of Luzon with its large and unruly population, or even of “only” the city of Manila, will not settle anything, but become only the source of new and endless complications and perplexities. It is just so with Porto Rico. The annexation of “only” Porto Rico in the West Indies will inevitably cause a constant and troublesome agitation for the annexation of the islands situated between Porto Rico and the United States. There will be no end of restlessness then, while the “strategical position,” if such a one is needed, could be obtained by securing a naval station without annexing a populous district behind it, just as England holds Gibraltar without owning Spain or a province of it.

Would it not be perfectly feasible to settle the future status of the Philippines by a conference with the Powers most interested in that region, and at the same time to obtain all the commercial and strategical advantages we require? And would it not be equally feasible, with equal advantage for ourselves, to help Porto Rico to an independent government as we are helping Cuba, and then endeavor to bring about a “Confederation of the Antilles,” embracing Cuba, Porto Rico, San Domingo and Hayti—which would give those islands a respectable international standing, while it would, of course, recognize our leadership?

But however that may be, I earnestly hope that it will commend itself to your judgment so to direct the Peace Commissioners that they will leave the question, whether any of the islands or parts thereof shall be or shall not be annexed, entirely open and unembarrassed for future decision when the people will have learned more clearly what such annexations involve.

Mr. McAneny informs me that the question he asked