Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 4.djvu/263

Rh can, if he pleases, compose those committees in a way favorable or unfavorable to certain lines of policy, or measures, or interests. He can make the Committee on Banking and Currency a protector or an enemy to the national banks. He can give the Committee on Pacific Railroads or on Public Lands a bias friendly or hostile to the land-grant roads. And so on. He can reward and exalt, or punish and humiliate members whom he likes or dislikes, or whom he wants to strengthen or to weaken, by giving them desirable or undesirable places on the committees. Moreover, he presides over the deliberations and administers the rules of the House. It is in a great measure in his power to recognize or not to recognize members who want to “catch his eye” in order to speak or make motions. He decides points of order—to be sure, subject to appeal—but his bare decision goes, of course, for much. And during those days of hurry and confusion which sometimes occur, especially towards the close of the session, a great many things may be put through the House by his rapid action, of which only he and those especially interested and watchful keep the run. In short, it is currently said that a bill to which the Speaker is seriously opposed has but a slim chance, and that a measure he desires to pass will frequently find unexpected and powerful help.

Such is the power of the Speaker, almost too vast and arbitrary in a government like ours, especially as to the composition of the committees. But all the more important is it to the country that this vast power, so dangerous if abused, should be wielded with the utmost scrupulousness and the highest sense of official honor; and all the more important to the Speaker himself that his disinterestedness, his impartiality—in one word, his official honor—should stand clean and clear not only above reproach, but above the reach of suspicion.