Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 4.djvu/108

74 When a man enters an Indian reservation and mischievously tries by false promises which he cannot perform, as in this case, or in any other way, to induce the Indians to run away, breaking up their settlements, an Indian agent will consider it his duty to enforce the above provisions of law.

The second part of the resolution is as follows: “That it shows consciousness of wrong and fear of justice when the highest officials belie their principles by denying a hearing in our own courts to those who claim the protection of the laws.” I suppose this refers to the circumstance that on some occasion I stated that, according to the opinion of lawyers I had consulted, an Indian tribe cannot sue the United States in the Federal courts, as decided by the Supreme Court in the case of the Cherokee Nation vs. the State of Georgia, which decision was delivered by Chief Justice Marshall. If there was any denial of justice in this then it was Chief Justice Marshall who did it, unless the lawyers misunderstand him; but certainly not I, for I declared at the same time that “if an Indian tribe could maintain an action in the courts of the United States to assert its right I should object to it just as little as I would object to the exercise of the same privilege on the part of white men.” It may be that the censure expressed in that resolution refers to the circumstance that when the brief of the United States District Attorney in Nebraska for an appeal from Judge Dundy's habeas corpus decision was submitted to me, I could not approve the principles upon which the argument of that brief was based and advised the Attorney-General that, as far as I, as Secretary of the Interior, was concerned, there was no desire that an appeal should be taken, but rather that Judge Dundy's decision should stand without question on the part of the Government. Moreover, I have repeatedly recommended the passage of a statute by