Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 3.djvu/450

424 the habit of politicians, when the people were laboring under business depression and distress, such as has been afflicting us for the last five years, to charge those managing the affairs of the Government with the responsibility for it all. And so they do now. When you ask them to particularize their charge in our case, they will tell you that the business collapse of 1873 was brought on by a contraction of the currency; that the Government withdrew from the business of the country the means with which to carry on that business, and that therefore business broke down.

This charge has been so often and so conclusively refuted, that it well nigh exhausts one's patience to refer to it again. But you have heard of men who tell the same yarn so often that they at last believe it themselves. So it may be with those who still insist that the crash of 1873 was caused by contraction. Indeed, the inflationists need that story for their theory. They cannot do without it, and therefore valiantly stick to it. What are the facts? I have the official tables before me. There was indeed a contraction of paper currency from 1865 to 1868, but the business collapse did not occur in 1868. It came five years later, and those five years between 1868 and 1873 are generally regarded as years of uncommon prosperity. Now, what happened with the currency between 1868 and 1873? In 1868 contraction was stopped. In 1869 the amount of paper currency outstanding was $693,946,056.61, in 1870 it was $700,375,899.48, in 1871 it was $717,875,751.06, in 1872 it was $738,570,903.52, in 1873 it was $750,062,368.94. This statement includes not only the greenbacks, the national-bank notes and the fractional currency, but also the State-bank circulation, the demand notes, the one- and two-year notes of 1863 and the compound interest notes. Thus, it appears that during several years preceding the crash of 1873 the