Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 3.djvu/331

Rh the appointments are governed by the recommendation or dictation of party leaders, and particularly of Congressmen, who, in many, if not in most, cases care less for the interests of the service than for the building up of their own home influence or party machine, by which to keep themselves in place, and who, to that end, use the offices to reward their political agents and tools with pay out of the Government treasury, or to secure the services of useful political workers for the future, thus turning the offices into means of bribery. In that way you will not only fail to insure the selection of honest and efficient men for office, but you will keep in the halls of Congress itself a class of men who have neither superior character nor ability to commend them, relying only upon a shrewd management of the patronage to carry their nominations and elections. That, then, is the way how not to do it.

But you can insure the selection of fit persons for office if, in the first place, the rule is established that officers shall not be liable to removal for party reasons, but only upon grounds connected with the discharge of their official duties, as it was tinder the early Administrations. This will prevent the occurrence of a very large number of vacancies at the same time, and enable the Executive Department in filling those vacancies to proceed with care and deliberate circumspection. Secondly, the Executive Department, which is responsible for the administration of public business, must, in making appointments or nominations to the Senate, remain independent of the dictation of Congressmen, many if not most of whom want to use the offices for the promotion of their own political ends. Thirdly, the qualifications of candidates for office must, whenever possible, be ascertained according to well regulated public methods, either by officers of the Departments themselves, or through competent men appointed for that purpose.