Page:Speeches, correspondence and political papers of Carl Schurz, Volume 2.djvu/474

454 What, then, can that clause of the Constitution mean? We have to judge of three different things: first, of the “qualifications,” and what they are the Constitution itself states; then of the returns, and what they are we all know; but we have also to judge of the elections—“elections” kept distinct from “qualifications,” and from “returns.” The qualifications may be complete; the returns may be in the most perfect order upon their face; and yet the Senate as well as the House of Representatives, both under the same clause of the Constitution, which must necessarily mean as to both houses the same thing, have to apply their judgment also to the election of their respective members. What does it mean, I ask? Must it not mean that the judgment of each house shall not only go to the forms, but also to what I might call the essence, of an election? Has not each house to judge whether that which pretends to be an election is in truth and reality an election or not? If the word “election” in that clause of the Constitution means anything, it must mean that; if it does not mean that, it means nothing. Now does anybody question, has anybody ever doubted, that the House of Representatives has always held so under the Constitutional clause which applies to both houses alike? The House of Representatives has always exercised the power, under this clause, to judge whether a man had been really and honestly and legally elected by a majority of the legal votes cast. Has it ever been questioned that the House of Representatives had the power, under this clause, to declare an election illegal and void, if that election had been controlled by bribery and fraud? As far as I know, nobody in the world has ever questioned it; and you will notice that power was exercised by the House of Representatives by virtue of identically the same clause of the Constitution under which we, as Senators, are to exercise our judgment.