Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 40.djvu/303

Rh innumerable minnie balls. Trees were broken off and splintered, and that entire forest, where the battle raged most furouslyfuriously [sic], was, on the following year, leafless, the stately but mute occupants having yielded up their lives with those whom they overshadowed."—Bates' Gettysburg, p. 145.

And speaking of the state of the hill on the fourth, he continues: "We came upon numberless forms, clad in grey, either stark and stiff or else weltering in their blood. * * * Turning whichever way we chose, the eye rested upon human forms lying in all imaginable positions. * * * We were surprised at the accuracy, as well as the bloody results of our fire. It was indeed dreadful to witness."—Id. p. 145.

FAILURE TO SEIZE CEMETERY HILL, JULY 1ST.

In the opinion of Col. Fiebiger and Major Steele, the only opportunity of decisive victory was lost when Ewell failed to seize Cemetery Hill, July 1, P. M. It could have been taken had the Union troops been vigorously pursued. Yet Fiebiger thinks Ewell was probably right (p. 135) in not attacking.

Major Steele: "Possession of Cemetery Hill was decisive of victory." 'Twas an error not to follow up the victory on 1st. That was the only chance to take the Hill. "Thus Lee's only chance of victory was thrown away."

Captain Smith: "Early and Rodes desired Lee to be informed they could go forward and take the hill if they were supported on their right."

General Hancock: "If the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill."

Colonel Batchelder, historian of Gettysburg: "There is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery Hill made within an hour would have been successful; at the end of an hour the troops had been rallied, occupied strong positions, &c., and would have held the positions against any attack from the troops then up. The great mistake of the battle was failure to follow the Union forces and attack them on Cemetery Hill before they could reform.

General Early has written an able and generous, but not convincing defense of his corps commander. He says he has changed his mind as to the probability of success, had Ewell advanced against Cemetery Hill. He even goes so far as to say, "There is nothing in the idea that we lost a great opportunity by not going in, the afternoon of the 1st."—S. Hist. Papers, -1877. Vol. IV, 260.

He urges further, that the possession of the Hill would not have been of any particular value. At best, it would only have thrown Meade back to the line on Pipe Creek, already selected and fortified.

As I have said, I am unable to agree with General Early's later conclusion on this point, but must think Ewell's failure to seize Cemetery Hill, a great error. Nor is this the only error he committed. General Lee desired to move Ewell's corps to the right on the evening of July 1st; but General Ewell pointed out the great importance of seizing Culp's Hill, which dominated Cemetery Hill, and pursuadedpersuaded [sic] him to leave his corps on the left, that he might seize that eminence, (So. Hist'l. Papers 1877, Vol. IV, p. 276), which he said he could do, without a fight. And yet he did not seize it, as he might have done, for Geary's troops did not begin to occupy it until 3 A. M. of July 2d; and