Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 40.djvu/262

258 absence of his cavalry. He said that he had been kept in the dark ever since crossing the Potomac, and intimated that Stuart's disappearance had materially hampered the movement, and disorganized the campaign."

Here then we have a sufficient reason for the failure of the Gettysburg campaign which had begun so auspiciously: the major part of Lee's cavalry did him no service whatever during the first week of the invasion.

But why was it absent? Was Gen. Lee ignorant of the importance of using his cavalry in screening his front, in reconnoitering, and securing information of the movements of the enemy? Such a supposition is absurd. On the other hand, knowing, and realizing as he must have done, the great importance of this use of his cavalry, did he fail to give his chief of cavalry the necessary orders to fulfill this function?

In other words, was Gen. Lee responsible for this fundamental mistake in his campaign? was it his intention to be separated from the bulk of his cavalry in his advance into Pennsylvania? To answer this question I direct your attention to the instructions given by General Lee to General Stuart. He wrote Gen. Ewell that he had instructed Gen. Stuart to "march with three brigades across the Potomac and place himself on your right and in communication with you; keep you advised of the movements of the enemy and assist in collecting supplies for the army." To Gen. Stuart himself Gen. Lee wrote, June 22: "You can move with the other three brigades into Maryland and take position on Ewell's right (Ewell was to march northward June 23d), place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army. One column of Ewell's army will probably move towards the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route, another by Chambersburg."

This order was repeated in a letter to Gen. Stuart dated June 23d, a part of which I will quote: