Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 40.djvu/259

Rh the safety of Washington would be considered the supreme object to be kept in view, and for this reason he felt no great anxiety for the Confederate Capital in making his march into Pennsylvania.

I cannot proceed to the story of the battle itself without calling your attention to an important feature of Lees' plan of campaign which is apt to be overlooked. I mean his purpose that General Beauregard should be ordered to Culpeper Courthouse, Va., in order to threaten Washington while Gen. Lee himself was marching into Pennsylvania. He believed that an army at that point "even in effigy," as he expressed it, under so famous a leader, would have the effect of retaining a large force for the defence of the capital, and diminishing by so much the strength of the army which would oppose him in Pennsylvania. The government at Richmond, however, was unwilling, or felt itself unable, to carry out this part of Lee's plan, though we now know there were certain brigades which were available for the purpose.

We touch here a fact of moment in forming an estimate of the military capacity of Gen. Lee: I mean that he was never in supreme command of the Confederate armies until a few weeks before the close of the war, when it was too late. Field Marshal Lord Wolseley remarks that for this reason we can never accurately estimate the full measure of Lee's military genius. Strange indeed that this great soldier should have been obliged to submit the plan of his campaign to the President and Secretary of War at Richmond before he could make any arrangements for putting it into operation! And should have been obliged, by their disapproval, to abandon a part of his plan, which was really of great importance for the general result. So good a military critic as Capt. Cecil Battine, of the English army, is of opinion that this proposal, if carried out, might have had a decisive effect upon the issue of the campaign. (See "Crisis of the Confederacy.")

I come now to consider the second stage of the Gettysburg campaign, the actual invasion of Pennsylvania.