Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 39.djvu/128

 116 Southern Historical Society Papers.

in getting the troops up, posting them, and arranging the bat- teries." Lee, however, had the whole field to supervise, and it was not his custom, when once he had indicated the object to be attained, to interfere with his subordinates. No man, in- deed, could post troops or arrange batteries with more skill than Longstre'et, and Lee no more thought of interfering with his dispositions at Gettysburg than he had with his dispositions at the second battle of Manassas. Nor will such arguments, how- ever they may be taken, mitigate the following: "General Lee said that the attack of his right was not made so early as ex- pected, which he should not have said. He knew that I did not believe that success was possible; that care and time ,^hould be taken to give the troops the benefit of positions and the ground ; and he should have put an officer in charge who had more con- fidence in his plan." Here we have the whole gospel of subordi- nation according to General Longstreet: If an officer does not believe success possible, he is not to be expected either to come up to time or to use his best endeavors to carry out his orders, and his want of confidence shall be held as sufficient excuse for inactivity and bad tactics. We need hardly say that such a dogma is absolutely incompatible with the demands of discipline. Discipline exacts something more than a literal obedience to orders. It evacts ungrudging support, untiring effort, and com- plete self-sacrifice. "I would follow General Lee blind-folded" were the words of Stonewall Jackson, and it was for this reason, if for no other, that Lee declared that had Jackson been with him Gettysburg would have been a Confederate victory. "Such an executive officer," he said of Jackson, "the sun never shone on. I have but to show him my design, and I know that if it can be done it will be done. No need for me to send and watch him." In General Longstreet he had a subordinate of very different character to deal with. It is little wonder that the Confederate commander-in-chief displayed impatience at Gettys- burg, or that his mood was such as to create the impression that his judgment was in some degree disturbed. We need look no further for the cause than the stubborn opposition and slow