Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 39.djvu/120

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dispositions accor.dinj2:ly." The most important part of this plan was that Jackson should deploy 80 to 100 guns along his front, and General Longstreet still thinks it was perfectly feasible for him to have done so. Herein he dififers radically from General Pendleton. Lee's chief of artillery. That officer reported that "the obstacles presented by the woods and swamps made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount of artillery to op- pose successfully the extraordinary force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the field itself afforded us but few positions favorable for its use, and none for its proper concentration." The map itself is sufficient to prove the fallacy of General Long- street's idea. Even in those days of muzzle-loaders, batteries could hardly have come into action within six or eight hundred yards of a strong line of artillery, heavily supported by infantry, and occupying a commanding position with an absolutely clear field of fire.

The further accusations against Jackson are even more extra- ordinary. He comments on Jackson's apparent inaction at \Miite C)ak Swamp, June 30, 1862, at the time when Longstreet and A. P. Hill were fighting a desperate battle at Frayser's Farm, only four miles distant. Surely he must be aware that General Lee was present at Frayser's Farm, and that if he had thought Jackson's presence desirable, it would have been exceedingly easy to call him up. The fact is that Jackson remained at White Oak Swamp, by General Lee's direction, in order to secure the Confederate left.

In his account of the action of Mechanicsville, he declares that Jackson "deliberately marched past the Federal flank half a mile or more behind the battle" without taking part in the en- gagement ; and to support this opinion he represents on his map that Jackson moved by Shady Grove church road. As a matter of fact, Jackson himself, and the greater part of his force, moved by a wood more than two and a half miles north of the Federal flank, and it was not till very late in the evening, just before dark, that he heard the sound of guns. The mishaps on June 26 were not due to Jackson at all, but to the failure of the staff