Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 39.djvu/118

 106 Southern Historical Society Papers.

statements are altogether at variance with the official records — that is, with the contemporary reports of officers who were eye- witnesses. In fact, it is perfectly apparent that General Long- street has been content to trust his memory, that he has often relied on hearsay evidence, and has made but little attempt to investigate the truth. This blemish affects both his narrative and his criticism. The former, when his own actions are con- cerned, can seldom be accepted without reservation ; the latter is often based on false premises, and is consequently of little value.

General Longstreet has not developed the critical habit since Appomattox. Throughout the war, whatever movement was in contemplation, he had generally something better to sug- gest. Even when victory was achieved he was seldom satisfied.

Had his advice, he implies, been taken, success would in almost every case have been more decisive ;■ and the most bril- liant maneuvers, whatever their result, were never exactly to his mind. It is true that the majority of Confederate soldiers have never accepted General Longstreet at his own valuation. Not only on the one occasion when he held an independent command, did he miss success, but his own shortcomings when serving under Lee have been exposed with unsparing severity. His political conduct during the reconstruction of the South alienated his former comrades, and no mercy has been shown to the soldier who labors under the accusation of having lost Get- tysburg, the great battle which turned the tide of war in favor of the North. The memoirs before us are practically an at- tempt on the part of General Longstreet to answer the charges with which he has been assailed, and his method of defense is decidedly peculiar. In reply to the criticism which has been lavished on his own conduct, he retorts by criticising with un- sparing severity the conduct of Lee, Jackson and Early ; and by endeavoring to show that other generals, better known to fame, committed far more glaring blunders than the commander of the First Army Corps.

We cannot think that General Longstreet consulted his own