Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 38.djvu/297

Rh His demeanor was exactly that of the quiet ante-bellum school teacher. As he entered he found his way to the nearest seat, with no commotion among the men other than that prompted by the natural feelings of gentlemen making room for a gentleman. As the congregation dispersed he made his way slowly through the departing crowd, and any soldier might upon feeling the pressure that came against him have seen General Jackson at one elbow and his messmate at the other. For military display Jackson had not an atom of fondness. He stuck to his old blue V. M. I. military suit until it had the shabbiness of reduced gentility. And this was not from indifference to personal neatness. He was too absorbed to give thought or time to the subject.

If we are not mistaken, Lord Wolseley has somewhere found fault with General Lee's failure to accomplish greater results at Fredericksburg. We trust merely to memory in making this statement, for he has expressed the greatest admiration for both General Lee and General Jackson. But, if he has so stated, the very clear and graphic account given by Colonel Henderson of the difficulties which would have confronted Jackson had he rushed across the plain upon Franklin's 40,000 men resting behind the natural entrenchments furnished by the roads of the country and covered by the powerful batteries on both sides of the Rappahannock, should answer the criticism. While it must forever remain a matter of speculation, we have many reasons to believe that Jackson was never satisfied with the decision not to make the proposed night attack upon Burnside, and, again, when the situation was in many respects repeated in April, 1863, with the conclusion not to strike Sedgwick, who, crossing at Fredericksburg, extended his left so as partly to reach or approach the ground held in December, 1862, by Franklin. Colonel Henderson quotes General Lee as saying: "Jackson at first preferred to attack Sedgwick's force in the plain of Fredericksburg, but I told him I feared it was as impracticable as it was at the first battle of Fredericksburg. It was hard to get at the enemy, and harder to get away if we drove him into the river, but if he thought it could be done, I would give the order for it."

"Jackson," continues Colonel Henderson, "asked to be allowed to examine the ground, but soon came to the conclusion